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Executive Summary
Intellectual property is not the only mechanism used in the American economy
for rewarding R&D. Prizes and contract research of various types are also com-
mon. Given the current controversies that swirl around intellectual property
policies, we review the economic reasoning that supports patent and other in-
tellectual property over the alternatives. For those economic environments
where intellectual property is justified, we review some of the arguments for
why it is designed as it is. We focus particularly on the issue of how broad
awards should be and how much protection should go to the original inventor
(as opposed to those who subsequently improve the invention). We emphasize
that the ideal design of an intellectual property system depends on the ease
with which rightsholders can enter into licensing and other contractual ar-
rangements involving these rights.
I.Introduction
Intellectual property is the foundation of the modern information econ-
omy. It fuels the software, life sciences, and computer industries, and
pervades most other products we consume. Although most inventors
consider it essential, it is currently under attack by some academics and
policymakers. One complaint is that intellectual property rewards in-
ventors beyond what is necessary to spur innovation. Another is that
intellectual property is a drag to innovation, rather than a spur, since it
prevents inventions from being used efficiently, especially in creating
further innovations. A third complaint is that some inventions should
not be protected at all but, instead, be supported by public sponsors.
Controversies over what should constitute intellectual property
swirl around business methods, computer software, research tools in
the biomedical industry, and genetic sequences. However this is not
new; controversies have swirled around every new technology in the52 Gallini and Schotchmer
twentieth century. A sampler might include the question of whether
player piano rolls should receive copyright protection, whether
purification of chemical compounds constitutes "invention" for pur-
poses of patent law, and whether mathematical algorithms such as
public key encryption should be patentable. Technologies that fall out-
side the subject matter of patents and copyrights have sometimes re-
ceived sui generis protections, such as computer chips under the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act.
For all these technologies, the same questions arise: Are there natural
market forces that protect inventors so that formal protections or other
incentives are not necessary? If not, is intellectual property the best in-
centive system, or would the technology more appropriately be devel-
oped by a public sponsor and offered freely in the public domain? How
should intellectual property be designed so as to minimize deadweight
loss due to monopoly pricing without undermining incentives to
innovate?
Our objective in this paper is to review what economists have said
about incentive schemes to promote R&D, including intellectual prop-
erty. While we focus on environments in which other forms of protec-
tion are not available, we note that other protections can obviate the
need for any formal reward system. For example, encryption offers the
potential to protect digitally distributed products such as music, mov-
ies, and software, even in the absence of intellectual property (National
Research Council 2000). In the realm of databases, for which formal
protections have been mandated in Europe and proposed in the U.S.
Congress, vendors are protecting their data with both clever business
strategies and technology (Maurer 1999, Maurer and Scotchmer 1999).
In markets with network effects, there may be natural barriers to entry,
so that a vendor may capture the entire market even without formal
protection (Farrell 1995). And, of course, trade secrecy can be an impor-
tant protection, especially when firms devise clever nondisclosure
agreements that enable them to license without leaking the secret to
unauthorized users (e.g., see Anton and Yao 1994). In some of these ex-
amples, the alternative protection involves social costs that could be
avoided by formal intellectual property. But if not, the case for intellec-
tual property may be weak.
In section II, we compare intellectual property with alternative in-
centive schemes. Without losing the thread of the paper, the reader
who is only interested in the design of intellectual property (as op-
posed to other incentive schemes) can skip the last three subsections ofIntellectual Property 53
section II. In section III we review optimal design issues for intellectual
property. especially the question of patent breadth, and in section IV
we turn to the special problems that arise when innovation is cumula-
tive. In section V. we summarize the arguments for and against intellec-
tual property. We comment on whether the design recommendations of
economists can actually be implemented, and argue that intellectual
property regimes should be designed so that the subject matter of each
one has relatively homogeneous needs for protection.
II.Alternative Mechanisms for Rewarding Innovation
Competitive markets may not be conducive to innovation, for a reason
that was well articulated by Arrow (1962). Inventions are information,
and information is a public good. An invention such as a wireless
palmtop is a combination of tangible embodiments and an intangible
idea, as well as information about how to manufacture it. Typically,
both the information and the tangible embodiments are costly to the in-
ventor, but only the tangible components are costly to a rival. Without
some sort of protection or reward, the inventor will therefore be at a
market disadvantage relative to rivals, and will possibly be dissuaded
from investing.
Arrow explained why some incentive scheme is needed, but not
which scheme. Many schemes have been used in practice. In the seven-
teenth century, for example, a prize was offered in France for develop-
ing a workable water turbine (Reynolds 1983, p. 338). For about a
century in the same era, a prize was outstanding for developing a
method to calculate longitude at sea (Sobel 1995). In the modern era,
R&D is sponsored to a large extent by government grants. According to
the National Science Foundation (2000), in 1998 about 30% of U.S. re-
search was funded by the Federal government. These examples raise
the following question: In what environments are there better incentive
schemes than intellectual property?
We shall use the term intellectual property (IP) to mean an exclusive
right to market an invention for a fixed time period. It includes copy-
rights, patents, plant patents, protection under the Plant Variety Protec-
tion Act, and other sui generis types of protection. By a prize we mean a
payment funded out of general revenue that is made to a researcher
conditional on delivering a specified invention. Prizes can either be tai-
lored individually to firms, depending on their efficiency characteris-
tics, or can be offered symmetrically to any firm that wants to compete,54 Gallini and Schotchmer
just as a patent is. By procurement, we mean a mechanism to solve the
problem of getting an invention at minimum cost, in a timely manner,
or otherwise efficiently (e.g., Laffont and Tirole 1986, 1987). A simple
procurement mechanism would be an auction for the right to be paid
when the invention is delivered.
A form of procurement commonly used in government-sponsored
research appears, on its face, to be a fixed-price contract. For example,
the National Institutes of Health give funding in advance for projects
that are described in the proposals. Funds are not withheld if the out-
put is not delivered, since the idea of the contract is to pay costs as they
accrue. If such funding were a one-time event for each researcher, re-
searchers might be inclined to "take the money and run." This moral
hazard problem is overcome because future grants are contingent on
previous success. The linkage between previous success and future
funding seems even more specific in the case of the National Science
Foundation. Fixed-price contracts thus operate much like prizes, with
the wrinlde that a researcher must convince the sponsor in advance
that his output might be worthy of a prize. For this purpose, his reputa-
tion might suffice, and in some cases, much of the research has already
been completed.
We begin our analysis with a benchmark. When both the costs and
values of innovations are publicly observable to both firms and a pub-
lic sponsor, IP is not the best incentive scheme. A better scheme is for a
public sponsor to choose the projects with the largest net social
benefits, and pay for them on delivery, using funds from general reve-
nue. With IP, projects are funded out of monopoly profits. Monopoly
pricing is equivalent to taxing a single market, which is generally
thought to impose greater deadweight loss than the broad-based taxa-
tion that generates general revenue. Thus, to justify intellectual prop-
erty, there must be some type of asymmetric information about the
costs and benefits of research programs.
We first make some comparative remarks about intellectual property,
prizes, and procurement contracts. These remarks are much in the
spirit of Wright (1983), who gave the first formal treatment of how
asymmetric information should inform our choice among incentive
mechanisms. In the subsections that follow, we then show that these
three mechanisms can generally be improved upon.'
IF has an obvious defect as well as obvious virtues. The defect is the
deadweight loss due to monopoly pricing. The virtues are several.
Most importantly, if the costs and benefits of R&D investments areIntellectual Property 55
known only to firms, and not to government sponsors, firmswill use
their superior knowledge to screen investments. A sponsordoes not
need to decide in advance which investments are meritorious. An in-
vestor knows that he will be punished by the marketif he does not in-
vest wisely. Another obvious virtue is that the prospectof valuable IP
might elicit higher levels of effort than those generally associatedwith
sponsored research. For example, much has been made of the human
genome project, whose completion wasaccelerated by a private firm
hoping to win IP rights on gene sequences. Finally, an IP system im-
poses the costs of an invention on its users.In other incentive mecha-
nisms, the costs are borne more generally by taxpayers. Taxpayers
might rightfully revolt if asked to bear the costs of developing, say,
computer games.
Lest these advantages of IP be overstated, however, we note that
prizes have many of the same virtues. If an investment'sprospective
value is known to the sponsor (or defined by the sponsor, as in the case
of military wares), the sponsor can screen projects himself. A prize sys-
tem then seems superior to IP. It avoids deadweight loss,and can be as
good as IF at motivating effort.
Moreover, IF will not work as an incentive mechanism unlessthird
parties can observe at least some aspects of value. A rightholder must
be able to defend his right against potential infringers. He must be able
to prove in court that his intellectual property meetsthe standard for
protection, and that an alleged infringer is marketing a productthat
falls within the breadth of his claims. Aspects of the invention'svalue
must therefore be observable ex post, although typically atthe high
cost of litigation and discovery.
The ex post observability requirement will typically impose less
cost under an IF system than under a prize system. Under anIP sys-
tem, the costs of discovery are incurred only if there islitigation. In
contrast, for a prize, costs would have to be incurred for everyinven-
tion in order for the sponsor to set a payment commensuratewith the
value.2 Therefore, our distinction is not really between observability
and nonobservability, but rather on whether the value is known to the
sponsor without incurring cost. The mostnatural example is when the
sponsor defines the value of the inventionhimself, as in military
procurement.
Recently the World Health Organization and the World Bank have
suggested prizes for developing vaccines that would not be devel-
oped or might not be widely enough distributed under a system of56 Gallini and Schotchmer
proprietary rights. The problems are great: how toassess whether a
vaccine merits a prize; how to ensure that the prizesare not given pre-
maturely before higher-quality vaccines are brought forward; howto
ensure that the prizes are actually given, when it is easy to manufacture
reasons to withhold them. Prizes can be organized so that worthy pro-
jects need not be identified in advance, but administering the prize
then becomes particularly burdensome. The problemsare particularly
acute where innovation is cumulative. See Kremer (2000) fora thought-
ful and detailed analysis of how such a system might work.
Unlike IF, a procurement contract would typically not be offeredto
all corners. Instead there would be a negotiation phase in which the
procurement officer tries to sort out which firm(s) are more efficient,
and only offers the "prize" to those firms. A mechanism that allows
such flexibility is more effective by definition thana prize offered to all
corners. As for prizes, the sponsor must identify worthy projects. For
traditional government procurement, such as for fighter jets, this is
automatic. For medical research, the sponsor may solicit open-ended
proposals, whicJ- entails administrative cost. In addition, the negotia-
tion required for procurement might be politically infeasibleas well as
costly.
In the next subsections, we investigate optimal incentive mecha-
nisms in specific research environments, with a view toward under-
standing how optimal mechanisms relate to IF, prizes, and simple
reimbursements. We focus on environments in whichno alternative
mechanisms for protection (private or market)are available, and on
single inventions that do not lead to future innovations. Following
Scotchmer (1999b), we stylize the allocation problemas having three
facets, which are intertwined. The first is the decision problem: shoulda
project be undertaken? The second is the delegation problem: by which
firms, or how many, and at what rates of investment? The thirdis the
funding problem: Can the deadweight loss of monopoly pricingbe
avoided?
The Problem of Aggregating Information
To solve the decision, delegation, and funding problems jointly, all the
information that is decentralized among firmsmay have to be aggre-
gated.IP, prizes, and simple procurement mechanisms suchas
fixed-price contracts and auctions cannot aggregate information, and
are therefore flawed at the outset.Intellectual Property 57
To see this, consider a well-defined project, such as finding an AIDS
vaccine or developing supersonic transport. Suppose that there are two
potential researchers, i = 1,2, and that each researcher i has an
efficiency parameter c for this project, interpreted as the cost of suc-
cess. The product will have a common value v regardlessof which firm
develops it, and each firm has a signal v of this value. The underlying
value will typically be determined by the extent of demand or anything
else that affects monopoly profit and social welfare. Because each v is a
noisy signal of an underlying common value, it is natural to suppose
that the signals {v1, v2} are correlated. It is less obvious whether the cost
parameters {c1, c2} would be correlated. We shall assume that they are
independent draws from a known distribution.
To make an efficient investment decision, each firm would like to
know the other firm's signal. For example, a firm with a low signal of
value, v1 =L, might invest if it knew the other firm had a high signal of
value, v2=H, but not otherwise. But neither the value nor its best esti-
mate is known ex ante to other firm, since neither can observe the
other's signal.
The importance of aggregating information is revealed in the follow-
ing special case in which both the costs and the signals take on binary
values: c{l,h}, v{L,H}. Suppose that the first-best, full-information
rule for allocative efficiency is that the project should be undertaken
unless (1) both firms have high costs, regardless of the signals of value
or (2) both firms have low signals of value, regardlessof costs. The proj-
ect should be undertaken by a single firm if (3) at least one firm has low
cost and at least one firm has a high signal of value, or (4) both firms
have high cost and both have high signals of value.
Suppose (c1, v7) = (l,L). Firm 1 should invest if (c2, v2) = (h,I-1) but not
if (c2, v2) = (h,L). Without knowing firm 2's information, firm 1 could
not make an efficient decision. Such could be the case under a patent
system. Firm 1 may fail to invest because it is pessimistic about value
(v1 = L), and firm 2 may fail to invest because its costs are too high
(c2 = h). If the firms could share their information, firm I would invest
based on firm 2's propitious information about the market. To some ex-
tent, the firms should be able to learn each other's private information
by observing each other's investments. However, even if the firms
know each other's costs, they might get stuck in an inefficient, but
self-reinforcing, equffibrium where each invests because the other is in-
vesting, and each incorrectly thinks the other has a high signal of value
(or vice versa) (Minehart and Scotchmer 1999). When the firms have58 Gailmi and Schotchmer
different, unobservable costs, the difficulties of making inferences from
investment behavior are compounded. A firm that invests could be do-
ing so either because it has low cost or because it has very propitious
private information about the market. The observing firm cannot dis-
tinguish between these two cases.
Neither IP nor prizes nor simple procurement mechanisms (e.g., auc-
tions) can cope with the problem of aggregating information.
Scotchmer (1999b) describes a procurement mechanism that bears little
resemblance to auctions, prizes, or IP, but can achieve as good an out-
come as when the signals of value are known, provided the firms' sig-
nals of value are correlated.3 While the mechanism described will
delegate efficiently, it may not be realistic given the constraints of gov-
ernment procurement. The mechanism might entail payments from
firms to the government, or payments to firms that are not asked to in-
vest. Such payments would be difficult to enforce.
The problems with the efficient procurement mechanism may ex-
plain the use of prizes, IP, and simple procurement mechanisms, but,
under the conditions presented in this example, no one has studied
their relative merits as second-best mechanisms. In order to identify
the relative merits of the simple schemes and other more realistic
mechanisms, we now consider the decision and delegation problems
separately.
The Delegation Problem
We isolate the problem of optimal delegation by assuming that the
sponsor already knows the optimal decision, namely, to invest. That is,
the sponsor knows the value of the project and that it exceeds the cost
of delivery but it does not know which firm(s) is (are) more cost-
efficient. Optimal delegation has two components: choosing the most
efficient firm or group of firms, and motivating the firm(s) to invest at
efficient rates.
If the sponsor faced only a problem of selecting the more efficient
firm(s), then the delegation problem would be easy to solve, e.g., by
auctioning the right to invest. In contrast, IP and prizes could lead to
inefficiency. If the market has room for only one firm, there is no reason
to suppose that the lower-cost firm will be the entrant, especially when
the relative efficiencies of the firms are not publicly observable.
But even an auction will not perform well when there is also a prob-
lem of inciting the right amount of effort, so that the invention is deliv-Intellectual Property 59
ered in a timely manner. The appropriate rate of progress is key to the
economics of R&D: How much additional cost should be tolerated in
return for a higher rate of progress?
A firm's willingness to accelerate invention at higher total cost de-
pends on the prize it will receive, conditional on delivering the prod-
uct. Thus the size of the prize determines the rate of investment.
However the optimal size of prize (and the optimal rate of investment)
depend both on the researcher's "efficiency" and on his efficiency rela-
tive to other firms. For an inefficient firm, the optimal rate of invest-
ment may be zero if it is possible to delegate to a more efficient firm,
but positive if the other firm is even less efficient. Thus, the problem is
to tailor prizes both to the firms' individual efficiencies and to their rela-
tive efficiencies.
Gandal and Scotchmer (1993) study this problem, and show that
the sponsor should offer a menu of options with both fixed fees
and firm-specific prizes.4 The menu serves two purposes: it gets the
firms to reveal their relative efficiencies, and, once the contracts are
awarded, it gets the firms to invest at the efficient rates. The difficulty
is in the coordination: each firm's efficient rate depends on both
firms' efficiency parameters. A simple patent or prize system, where
the IP or prizes are not tailored to the firms' relative efficiency, wifi not
ensure that only the most efficient firm(s) invest, or at the efficient
rates. And a simple fixed-price contract may not create incentives to in-
vest fast enough, even if the contract is auctioned to the more efficient
firm.
The message here is that, even when the value of the prospective in-
vention is known prior to the investments, optimal procurement re-
quires a mixture of prizes and fixed payments, rather than a pure prize
system, a patent system, or an auction. Simple mechanisms can be res-
urrected as best in very simple contexts. An auction performs well
when the only issue is to choose the most efficient firm, but there is no
issue of eliciting the right amount of effort. A simple prize performs
well when there is a single firm qualified to undertake the research. If
the prize is set equal to the social value, the firm will have the same ob-
jective function as society and will invest efficiently. Since the best sim-
ple mechanisms are different for different simple contexts, it is no
surprise that complicated research environments with several firms
call for mechanisms that combine instruments.
In the next section we focus on the optimal decision problem, assum-
ing that the value of the innovation is unknown. In order to avoid the60 Gallini and Schotebmer
problem of optimal delegation, we also assume there is a single poten-
tial researcher.
The Decision Problem
We have just pointed out that if there is a single firm qualified for the
research program, the optimal mechanism is a prize set equal to the so-
cial value. The firm's private incentives are then aligned with social in-
centives. However, to set such a prize, the sponsor must know the
social value in advance or observe it ex post. Since IP automatically
reflects the social value, at least to some extent, IP looks like an attrac-
tive alternative to a prize when the social value is unobservable. We
now investigate whether this justification for IP holds up.
Kremer (1998) proposes a system to create a prize equal to the social
value, even when the sponsor cannot observe it in advance. His pro-
posal involves IP, but avoids deadweight loss by turning a patent into a
prize. He proposes that the patent authority take possession of the pat-
ent, and auction it to the highest bidder, assuming that every firm can
observe the value ex post. The rules of the auction are that with very
small probability the patent will actually be sold to the highest bidder,
and otherwise the invention will be put in the public domain. Firms
wifi bid the true value, hence revealing it. The social value is estimated
from the revealed private value, and the inventor receives a prize equal
to the social value, paid out of general revenue. He wifi thus invest if
the social value exceeds his cost, as is efficient.5
Another scheme to avoid deadweight loss is proposed by DeLaat
(1996). To illustrate his idea in a very simple model, suppose that a po-
tential R&D project is described by a pair (c,v), where c is the cost,
which is observable to the sponsor, and v is the value, which is not. But
if the cost c is observable to the sponsor, he can ask the researcher to re-
port the prospective value v, and then give a fixed-price contract to re-
imburse the cost c if and only if the prospective value exceeds the cost.
Since the researcher earns zero profit whatever he reports (he is only re-
imbursed the cost), he will report the value truthfully to the sponsor,
who will make the efficient decision whether to invest. Thus, IP is
unnecessary.
But this scheme only seems credible if (contrary to the premise) the
value of the invention is observable ex post, or if the sponsor can verify
that the researcher is investing exactly as he promised (as deLaat as-
sumes explicitly).6 If not, the researcher could use the contract moneyIntellectual Property 61
for other purposes and deliver a shoddy product; there is a disabling
problem of moral hazard, which IP could overcome.
Nevertheless, we can conclude from the arguments of Kremer and
deLaat that if either cost or value is truly observable to a sponsor, there
may be a better mechanism than IF. Consistent with this view,
Scotchmer (1999a) justified patents by assuming that the cost and value
are both unobservable. A similar interpretation can be madefor Cor-
nelli and Schankerman (1999). The latter present a model where the
value of an invention is endogenous to the firm's investment effort,
which, in turn, depends on an unobservable efficiency parameter. In ef-
fect, neither cost nor value is observable to the sponsor. Thus it is hard
to see how any mechanism short of IF could be effective. Since the
value of the patent increases with the value of the invention, a patent
system gives the firm at least some incentive to spend more resources
to create a product of greater value. Cornelli and Schankerman show
how this incentive can be increased by using a patent renewal system.
The patent renewal system is a menu of options (F,T), where F is a
payment from the patentholder to the sponsor and T is a patent life.7
The fee F increases with the patent life, and might start out negative (a
subsidy). The patentee can then "buy" a longer patent life by paying re-
newal fees. The value of the patent automatically increases with the
value of the invention, but increases more for higher-value inventions,
since those are the ones that will be renewed in return for fees. Thus the
incentive to develop higher-value products is compounded.
Scotchmer (1999a) derives the renewal system as a multidimensional
screening mechanism for ideas, (c,v), where both are unobservable.
Again, it is the higher-value ideas that will be renewed the longest,
compounding their value. Thus the cost c that firms are willing to bear
may go up faster than linearly with the value of the innovation, v.
As mentioned, the renewal system could start with subsidies, which
are then reduced as firms pay fees in return for a longer patentlife.
Subsidies are advocated by Shavell and van Ypersle (1998) on grounds
that they are a more efficient way to reward innovators than IF. Subsi-
dizing low-value innovations allows the protection on high-value in-
novations to be shorter (thus reducing the deadweight loss), without
jeopardizing incentives to innovate.
The problem with subsidies, of course, is that they may be exploited
by opportunistic firms, which could collect the subsidy and either not
invest or produce something worthless. To avoid this problem, subsi-
dies, like their close kin, prizes, must be contingent on some aspect of62 Gallini and Schotchmer
the resulting invention, such as its value. Thus it seems reasonable to
suppose that subsidy schemes will not be used if the invention's value
or success cannot be verified ex post. But then we have a contradiction.
If subsidies are possible, it must be because some aspect of value is ob-
servable ex post. If so, IP should not be used at all, since prizes (re-
wards, fixed-price contracts) dominate. IF and prizes can serve the
same screening function, and can motivate firms to the same levels of
effort, but prizes avoid the deadweight loss. Consistent with this ca-
veat, renewal schemes seen in practice do not provide for subsidies.
(See Calandrillo (1998) for a broader set of criticisms of subsidies.)
In conclusion, IF can be justified in two ways. First, it can be justified
as a screening mechanism to encourage investment in high-value pro-
jects, which may also have high cost. Second, it can be justified as a
means to increase the rate at which firms invest, either to increase value
or to accelerate progress. Without a means to link prizes to social value,
there is no alternative to achieve these results. These virtues of IP
should be weighed against the aggregation problems described earlier
when more than one firm is capable of the research.
Assuming that, in a second-best analysis, IP would prevail, we now
ask how the right should be designed. We have already discussed the
benefits of a renewal system. But how broad and long should protec-
tion be?
III.Optimal Design: The Case of a Single Innovation
Perhaps the most influential work on patent design was that of
Nordhaus (1969), who explained why patents (or other IF) should have
finite length. If the sole concern is to encourage innovation, then IP
should last forever. And if the sole concern is to avoid deadweight loss
that occurs through proprietary prices, then IF should not exist at all. A
finite length of protection balances these two concerns. Longer protec-
tion would encourage more innovation, but only by prolonging the
deadweight loss on inventions that would be made anyway.
Nordhaus's simple framework spawned a large literature on the de-
sign of IF with consideration of patent races, imitation by rivals, tech-
nology licensing, and how the design question changes when
technology is cumulative. In this section we focus on the design ques-
tion of breadth (also called scope), which occupied considerable journal
space in the 1990s. In the next section we turn to sequential or cumula-
tive research, where breadth plays a different role.Intellectual Property 63
We begin with Gilbert and Shapiro (1990; GS), who introduced the
notion of patent scope into the Nordhaus analysis. They define patent
scope as the price p that the innovator is able to charge for the product
that embodies the innovation. Thus a patent policy is (T,p), where T is
the patent life. While such a definition is far removed from what a court
might use, the analysis that arises from using it is still informative, as
discussed below. Maximizing social surplus over all combinations (T,p)
that yield enough revenue to cover the cost of research, CS find that op-
timal patent length is infinite, with the patent scope set at the level that
just covers R&D investment.8 That is, the optimal design is for the pat-
ent to be narrow and long.
Gallini (1992) reversed this design conclusion in a model where pat-
ent breadth determines the ease of entry into the protected market. She
defined scope technologically, as the cost K that rivals must incur to im-
itate the invention without infringement. Thus a patent policy is a pair
(T,K). The lower price that results from narrow scope arises from rivals'
attempts to "invent around" the patent, rather than from some type of
regulatory or antitrust action, as assumed by GS. In contrast to GS, the
innovator's profit does not strictly increase with patent life, since a
long patent life will encourage imitation (hence competition) before the
patent expires. An increase in patent life provides incentives for waste-
ful imitation but not for productive innovation.
For a given imitation cost K, a sufficiently long patent will attract im-
itators, resulting in oligopoly pricing instead of monopoly pricing.
Conversely, for a given patent life T, a sufficiently narrow scope will at-
tract entrants. Patent life and scope are complementary in that both in-
struments must be increased or reduced to achieve most efficiently the
required reimbursement to the innovator.
With imitation, the social cost of a patent may have two components:
deadweight loss and the cost of imitation. The optimal patent policy
minimizes these costs. Gallini shows that the optimal design is to avoid
entry entirely by making the patent broad and short, in contrast to that
proposed in CS. That is, the patent should be just long enough to gen-
erate the required revenue for the monopolist patentholder, and broad
enough to prevent imitation.
However, this reversal depends on an assumption about licensing
(or, rather, its absence). In the Gallini model, if the patent is too long or
too narrow, the innovator is assumed to sit back passively and watch
imitators erode her market share. Maurer and Scotchmer (1998; MS)
point out that the duplicative waste could be avoided voluntarily64 Galimi and Schotehmer
through licensing rather than by adjusting patent policy, which can
again reverse the optimal design. Whatever the market outcome with-
out licensing, the innovator and potential entrants can achieve the
same market outcome (price and number of entrants) through a licens-
ing agreement with appropriate royalties and other fees. Since both the
innovator and potential entrants can jointly save the imitation costs,
they prefer licensing to imitation. The innovator can do even better by
fine-tuning the number of entrants.
An important point of agreement among CS, Gallini, and MS is that
a narrow patent reduces market price. However, their arguments differ.
CS have in mind some sort of regulatory mechanism; Gallini argues
that the price reduction wifi occur through duplicative entry; and MS
argue that the price reduction will occur through licensing to prevent
duplication. In addition, the analyses of social cost differ, leading to dif-
ferent prescriptions about optimal length and breadth. Since CS do not
recognize imitation costs, they simply ask whether the deadweight loss
of monopoly pricing is smaller with a long patent and low price, or
with a short patent and high price. Callini argues that if the social cost
includes the cost of imitation, the optimal policy should be aimed at
avoiding it. MS argue that the imitation costs will not be borne in prac-
tice if licensing is available, so that the CS type of analysis is restored.
It is worthwhile expanding on why licensing will lower the market
price, by considering what would happen if there were a single poten-
tial entrant. The latter situation was analyzed by Callini (1984), who
first pointed out that licensing can prevent entry With a single poten-
tial entrant (or a fixed number), the optimal licensing strategy is to sus-
tain the profit-maximizing (monopoly) price with high royalties, and to
share the revenues by using other fees. The licensor has an incentive to
keep the market price high regardless of the cost of imitation. In con-
trast, in the argument above, the licensor is worried about imitation by
nonlicensees as well as by licensees; there is always an unlicensed po-
tential entrant. The patentholder commits to a low market price pre-
cisely to reduce the attractiveness of entry by nonlicensees, who can be
numerous and unidentifiable exante.This point stressesthe
significance of potential entry to the welfare analysis of licensing and,
therefore, to the optimal design of IP.
The foregoing discussion shows that private contracting can dramat-
ically alter the optimal design of patents, and that public and private
instruments may be complementary in reducing social costs. Patent
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ing prevents wasteful imitation. In this environment where goods are
homogeneous, licensing determines the design of patent policy: If li-
censing is available, a case can be made for narrow and long patents; if
licensing is not available, the analysis points to patents that are broad
and short.
Licensing may not occur for a variety of reasons, in which case we
need a more thorough investigation of the relative merits of the CS and
the Gaffini arguments, in broader economic environments than they
address. Such an analysis has been provided by DenicolO (1996). He ex-
plains that narrow (and long) or broad (and short) patents depend on
the concavity or convexity, respectively, of the relationship between so-
cial welfare and postinnovation profit. Situations in which relatively
short broad patents are optimal include costly imitation; Cournot du-
opoly with constant marginal costs; and horizontally differentiated
firms and linear transportation costs, as in Klemperer (1990).
We now turn to cumulative innovation in which subsequent research
activity is directed toward the development of improvements or appli-
cations of a previous innovation.
IV.Optimal Design: The Case of Cumulative Innovation
In the above discussion, IP is designed for isolated innovations that
may be imitated. In reality, research is cumulative. Innovations
build upon each other, and subsequent research activity is directed
toward improvements or applications of previous discoveries. This
fact changes the problem of patent design in interesting and complex
ways.
Thefirstand most fundamental complexity,articulated by
Scotchmer (1991), is that early innovators lay a foundation for later in-
novations. The later innovations could not be made without the earlier
ones. So that the first innovator has enough incentive to invest, she
should be given some claim on profit of the later innovations; other-
wise, early innovators could be underrewarded for the social value
they create. This is particularly evident in the case of a research tool for
which all the social value resides in the innovations it facilitates. If the
innovator could not profit from the later products, she would have no
incentive to create the tool. The incentive problems are particularly
vexed in the case of creative destruction, discussed by Schumpeter
(1943): an innovator's descendants can actually become the instru-
ments of his destruction.66 Gallini and Schotchmer
The Schumpeterian perspective highlights an important problem
that arises in the cumulative context: that of dividing the profit be-
tween innovators in a way that respects their costs. If, for example,
only one pot of money is available for distribution between two inno-
vators and most is allocated to the first firm, the second inventor's in-
centive for research is reduced, and vice versa. Green and Scotchmer
(1995) argue that because of the difficulties in dividing profit, patent
lives will have to be longer than if the whole sequence of innovations
occurred in a single firm. Ex ante licensinglicensing before invest-
ments are madeis a way of mimicking the latter outcome. As in the
case of a single invention, the availability of private contracting
influences the optimal patent scope when innovation is cumulative
(see below).
Cumulativeness changes the design instruments that are relevant to
the length of protection. The statutory life can be irrelevant when a
noninfringing substitute, such as an improvement, can displace a pro-
tected product. What matters is the effective life, that is, the time until
the noninfringing substitute appears (Scotchmer 1991; O'Donoghue,
Scotchmer, and Thisse 1998 (OST)). The effective life is determined by
patent scope or leading breadth, which is interpreted as the minimum
quality improvement that avoids infringement. As in the case of costly
imitation discussed above, the effectiveness of patent life as an instru-
ment for R&D may be limited when subsequent innovation can under-
mine profitability
Finally, cumulativeness makes a third instrumentthe minimum
standard for protection, or minimum inventive steprelevant to the
optimal design of IF. For copyrighted works the standard for protection
is low (as is the breadth of protection), while for patents, the
patentability standard (or novelty requirement) can be quite stringent.
In our discussion of isolated inventions above, we assumed that the in-
vention was protectable, since there would be no incentives to innovate
if there were no IF or other incentive instruments. But in the cumula-
tive context, patentability on second-generation inventions is less es-
sential, since an innovation can be protected by an exclusive license on
a previous patent it infringes, rather than by its own patent. Leading
breadth and the standard for patentability together determine the level
of "forward protection" each innovation has.
Several arguments favoring both weak and strict standards for IP
protection have been advanced. Scotchmer and Green (1990) argue
with caution for a weak standard (a weak "novelty requirement"), so
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these disclosures could speed up invention by giving a technological
boost to competitors, Scotchmer and Green warn that the weak novelty
requirement could also encourage firms to choose trade secrecy over
patents. In contrast, a tightening of the standards for patentability can
encourage firms to be more ambitious in the improvements they at-
tempt to develop (O'Donoghue 1998) or can direct their investments
toward more socially useful inventions (Eswaran and Gallini 1996).
Even when the standard for protection does not reorient research ef-
forts, it can affect the division of profit among sequential researchers.
Scotchmer (1996) argues that the strictest novelty requirement (no pro-
tection) on second-generation products would tilt the joint profit of a
sequence of innovations in favor of earlier innovators without jeopar-
dizing second-generation advances. A second-generation product can
be protected by an exclusive license on the infringed patent of the ear-
lier generation. Denicolô (2000a, b) makes a case for a patent policy
with a weak patentability standard and narrow leading breadth. In a
model in which firms race for the first- and second-generation patents,
he shows that tilting profits in favor of earlier innovators might only
encourage a socially wasteful patent race at the stage of basic research
and underinvestment in the second stage.
Although the complexities of cumulativeness seem to defy clear,
unqualified design implications, one lesson is clear: The optimal design
of IP depends importantly on the ease with which rights holders can
contract around conflicts in rights. Contracting is especially relevant to
the question of breadth, which determines the likelihood that a fol-
low-on innovation wifi infringe a prior patent.
A danger of IP that has been debated from its inception to the present
(see Machlup and Penrose 1950) is that IP can stifle innovation and
slow progress. Merges and Nelson (1990) link this danger to breadth,
using examples from the aircraft, radio, and pharmaceutical industries
to argue for narrow patents. An earlier example concerned steam en-
gines. James Watt refused to license his patents for improvement, with
the result that there was a flood of pent-up invention when his patents
expired in 1800 (Derry and Williams 1993, p. 324).
In contrast, Kitch (1977) argues that broad patents are socially
beneficial precisely because they stimulate further developments.
Scotcbmer (1991) and Green and Scotchmer (1995) take the same point
of view, but focus on how ex ante contracting affects division of profit.
With ex ante contracting, the role of breadth is not to determine
whether subsequent products are made (they will be made if they add
to joint profit), but rather to determine how the profit is divided. This68 Galimi and Schotchmer
theme is also carried forward in later papers, e.g., Merges (1998, 1999),
Scotchmer (1996), Lemley (1997) (who compares how copyright and
patent doctrines respectively treat the possibifity of blocking),
O'Donoghue, Scotchmer, and Thisse (1998), and Schankerman and
Scotchmer (2001). Matutes, Regibeau, and Rockett (1996) and Chang
(1995) argue for broad patents even without assuming that ex ante con-
tracts can be made.
To some extent, broad patents are also supported by the arguments
of O'Donoghue, Scotchmer, and Thisse (1998), who study breadth in a
model with with an infinite sequence of improved products (quality
ladder). If patents are relatively narrow, the effective life of each patent
ends when a noninfringing improvement arrives, and is thus endoge-
nous. But if the patent is broad, then the statutory life is also the effec-
tive life: Every subsequent innovation on the quality ladder infringes
during the statutory life and must be marketed under license. To
achieve the same rate of progress under both regimes, the effective pat-
ent life with a narrow patent must be longer than the (effective) statu-
tory life with a broad patent. Broad, short patents are more efficient at
rewarding innovators along the quality ladder, because less of the total
profit in the system accrues to high-value innovations that would be
made in any case, and more goes to the innovators who need addi-
tional incentives.
Thus, with some caution, we can extract from the literature a case for
broad (and short) patents. Broad patents can serve the public interest
by preventing duplication of R&D costs, facffitating the development
of second-generation products, and protecting early innovators who
lay a foundation for later innovators. However, these benefits disap-
pear if licensing fails. Heller and Eisenberg (1998) argue that licensing
wifi likely fail when researchers must negotiate multiple licenses, as
now occurs in the biomedical industry Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998)
caution that these transaction costs may limit the use of contracts for
coordinating innovations that follow from a broad patent.
Another problem with licensing is that it can lessen competition both
in innovation markets9 and in product markets. It thus raises antitrust
issues, even in the simpler context where there is no cumulative aspect.
One of the difficult issues is determining whether an ex ante merger of
research activities through licensing is efficient or inefficient from a so-
cial perspective. On the efficiency side, ex ante licensing can enable
firms to avoid duplicated costs and to delegate efficiently, much as dis-
cussed in section II. But on the inefficiency side, ex ante licensing can
retard progress, e.g., by nullifying the acceleration that would other-Intellectual Property 69
wise come from a patent race. See Gilbert and Sunshine (1995) for a dis-
cussion of these issues.'°
The cumulative context raises another issue. Above we focused on
the salutary effects of licensing, namely that ex ante licensing can en-
sure investment in infringing follow-on products that would add to
joint profit. Turning this argument on its head, licensing can stifie
noninfringing follow-on products that would detract from joint profit.
Gallini and Winter (1985) analyze a situation where a potential compet-
itor is licensed ex ante in order to dissuade him from investing in a
noninfringing cost reduction that would have lowered prices in the
market. Such licensing clearly reduces product market competition rel-
ative to what the Congress apparently intended in designing patent
law. If such licensing occurred ex post to prevent production of the cost-
reducing innovation after it had been developed, it would presumably
be an antitrust violation. Chang (1995) analyzes precisely that type of
ex post collusion and advocates a strict antitrust rule against collusion.
For a discussion of how principles of competition policy might be for-
mulated to distinguish ex ante licensing that is procompetitive from
that which is anticompetitive, see Scotchmer (1998).
Besen and Maskin (2000) argue that if firms do not license in a way
that takes full advantage of their IP, e.g., because of antitrust restric-
tions, then licensing may reduce industry profits below those available
without licensing, and the broad patents that support such licensing
are counterproductive. In this sense, Besen and Makin's paper is con-
sistent with the above observation that impediments to contracting
may strengthen the case for narrow patents.
In light of these qualifications, what conclusions can we make for
patent design in the cumulative context? One interpretation is that,
when research is cumulative, relatively broad patents may be efficient
if ex ante contracting is available. However we prefer to be cautious;
the jury is still out.
What is conclusive is the importance of private contracting. Whether
property rights are helpful or counterproductive in encouraging inno-
vation depends on the ease with which innovators can enter into agree-
ments for rearranging and exercising those rights, as constrained by
the rules of antitrust law.
V.Conclusions
In the past two decades, academic interest in the economics and law
of intellectual property has exploded. The renewed interest has been70 Gallini and Schotchmer
fueled by controversies surrounding new technologies, by interna-
tional agreements, and by changes in the nature of protection, e.g., see
Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998). It is generally thought that IP rights have
been strengthened, but there is also evidence that some forms of IP, in
particular, patents, have previously been ineffective (Cohen et al. 2000).
Contrary to the apparent intent, strengthening of IP is thought by some
commentators to impede research rather than to promote it (Heller and
Eisenberg 1998). In this environment, economists have had much to say
about both the optimal design of IF and the advisability of substituting
other incentive mechanisms.
Although it comes as no surprise that a property system has defects,
we hope we have illuminated some offsetting virtues, and some cir-
cumstances where other mechanisms, such as prizes, fixed-price con-
tracts, and auctions can dominate. Our main conclusions on the
effectiveness of intellectual property are that:
IP is probably the best mechanism for screening projects when value
and cost are not observable by the sponsor, since the private value of IP
reflects the social value, and firms automatically compare some meas-
ure of value with the cost of innovation. In addition, IP encourages
firms to accelerate progress, since the reward is conditional on success.
Prizes could serve the same purposes if the size of the prize could be
linked to the social value but without the deadweight loss of monopoly
pricing.
Neither IF nor prizes can aggregate the information that is decen-
tralized among firms, and neither will be completely effective at dele-
gating research effort efficiently. A procurement system that restricts
prizes to certain firms, or differentiates prizes according to firms' rela-
tive efficiencies, can improve on a simple prize system or patent sys-
tem, but then there must be an ex ante negotiation to select the favored
firms.
For circumstances where IF is justified, we asked how the property
right should be designed. Every IP regime has provisions on length,
breadth, and the standard for protection. The economics literature on
design of IF concerns the appropriate choice of these provisions. The
optimal length, breadth, and standard for protection depend on the
economic environment, e.g., the shape of the demand curve, the rate at
which improvements to existing technologies are developed, or the rel-
ative costs of sequential innovators.Intellectual Property 71
How much flexibility is there in designing IP rights differently for
different economic environments? In fact, there is a lot of flexibility.
Different IP regimes are targeted at different subject matter, and the
subject matter is an important defining aspect of the IP regime. Copy-
right has traditionally been targeted at literature, other printed matter,
and art. Patents have traditionally been targeted at manufactured
items. The subject matters of sui generis laws typically have been very
specific, e.g., the Plant Patent Act, the Plant Variety Protection Act, the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, and the proposed database
legislation.
The IP regimes that cover different subject matter are noticeably var-
ied in the three important features: length, breadth, and standard for
protection. On the matter of length, copyrights last essentially forever,
patents last 20 years, and chip protection lasts 10 years. On the matter
of breadth, copyright protection is restrained by fair use exemptions
and by the fact that the underlying "ideas" are not protected; patents
have the doctrine of equivalents; and copying of chips is allowed for
some uses but not others. We thus believe that it is incorrect to criticize
the economic design arguments on grounds that, in IP, "one size fits
all." While we do not think it would be appropriate to define new IF re-
gimes for every small category of technology, we wish to emphasize
that the Congress can exercise as much flexibility as it wishes, and that
courts also have some flexibility.
Each IF regime should cover subject matter with similar needs for
protection, especially if heterogeneous needs cannot be remedied by
courts. Many controversies arise because of heterogeneity within IF re-
gimes. For example, business methods probably do not need the strong
protection provided by the Patent Act, even though such protection is
appropriate for other patentable subject matter. A new regime could
have been created for business methods, but protection under the Pat-
ent Act could alternatively be weakened through the courts' interpreta-
tion of novelty and nonobviousness.
Finally, there are the design recommendations themselves. We have
not been specific in this review about the exact ways in which length,
breadth, and standards for protection should reflect the economic envi-
ronments, and refer the reader to the underlying papers for more de-
tail. Instead, we have emphasized a message of a different sort: the
optimal design of the property right should depend on whether firms
contract with others for the use of their protected innovations. With
fluid contracting, policies that otherwise would be inefficient may be72 Gallini and Schotchmer
optimal. For example, licensing can avoid wasteful imitation, making
an otherwise inefficient narrow patent optimal. In the cumulative con-
text, there is a danger that broad patents will inhibit future innovators
from making product improvements. But with contracting, the
patentholder can profit from, instead of being threatened by, new im-
proved products, and will ensure that they arise even if infringing. The
most striking message of the literature is that IP and private instru-
ments may be complementary in reducing social costs from an over-
reaching or insufficient protection regime.
However, contracting also has the potential to undermine competi-
tion in ways that were not anticipated or approved by the Congress
when designing IP. Contracting that we have not covered includes
cross-licensing and patent pools. We have also not discussed joint ven-
tures and other alliances for avoiding litigation, duplicated efforts, and
holdups. A recurring theme, especially evident in these contexts, is that
despite the efficiencies that contracting can ensure, contracting may
also facilitate anticompetitive behavior. See Hall and Ziedonis (2001),
Shapiro (2000), Denicolô (2000a, b). To understand whether the prop-
erty system is too strong, too weak, or necessary at all requires us to
understand the incentives for contracting, and its potential anticom-
petitive consequences.
Notes
This article will also appear in Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions, F. Cafaggi,
A. Nicita and U. Pagano, eds., Routledge Studies in Political Economy (2002).
For example, in the environment discussed by Wright (1983), none of the three mecha-
nisms is optimal. The first best can be achieved with a mechanism similar to the one men-
tioned in note 3 below.
Prizes might also require enforcement. John Harrison's longitude prize was delayed
for decades while the prize committee attempted to prove that astronomical solutions
were superior to his clock. Harrison eventually sought redress in Parliament, and was
partially rewarded.
She suggests a two-part procedure. The sponsor first asks the firms to reveal their in-
formation on value and then, if warranted, employs the best procurement mechanism to
delegate to the least-cost firm(s). Following Cremer and McLean (1988), it is costless to
get the firms to reveal their correlated information on value. They are asked to report
their signals of value, and then rewarded if they agree and punished if they disagree.
Due to the correlation, an equilibrium is to report truthfully, and the payments can be
chosen so that each firm makes zero expected profit.
A related problem is studied by Bhattacharya et al. (1998). Instead of assuming that
firms have different efficiency parameters, they assume that firms have different knowl-Intellectual Property 73
edge about the cost of achieving an innovation. If the knowledge is revealed, then all
firms have the same cost. Their mechanisms also use payments conditional on delivery
(prizes).
We caution, however, that the Kremer scheme is efficient only if there is a single re-
searcher. A prize equal to the social value could easily attract other firms to a race in
which the firms overinvest (Loury 1979). Not only is there a problem of overinvesting,
but inefficient firms as well as efficient firms may invest. This is the problem avoided by
the more complex procurement mechanism discussed above, where prizes are tailored to
the firms' relative efficiency in order to make sure that the investment effort is under-
taken by the more efficient ones.
In deLaat's model, the sponsor chooses the "size of the invention," which is observ-
able, given the firm's report of the market size (value), which is unobservable to the
sponsor. DeLaat assumes that the sponsor can verify which invention is made, but not
the market conditions (e.g., demand) for the invention.
For recent empirical investigations of how firms exercise their option to renew, and
implications for the values of innovations, see Lanjouw (1997) and Schankerman (1998).
The intuition for this result can be found in the familiar economic principle that un-
derlies Ramsey pricing. Ramsey pricing solves the problem of maximizing consumer
surplus in multiple markets subject to the constraint that revenues cover cost. The solu-
tion is to set prices below monopoly prices so that the markup of price in each market is
inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand in each market. In the patent problem,
the different time periods are parallel to different markets, and since the demands are as-
sumed to be constant over time, the markup of price over cost in each period is identical.
See the U.S. Department of Justice-Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995) for a discussion of innovation markets.
One of the thorny questions that arise is whether competition policy should view II-
censing practices more leniently than otherwise if incentives to innovate are at stake. See
Gallini and Trebilcock (1998) for a discussion of this issue.
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